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USE OF TESTIMONY OF FORMER TRIAL
THE MISSOURI LAW RELATIVE TO THE USE OF TESTI-
MONY GIVEN AT A FORMER TRIAL
By WILLIAM G. HALE
There are four ways in which testimony given at a former trial
may figure in a pending trial: first, in impeachment; second, as
an admission; third, as the testimony of a non-available witness
offered under an exception to the hearsay rule; and fourth, in re-
freshing recollection.'
I. IMPEACHMENT
This phase of the subject does not call for extended treatment.
It is mentioned primarily for the sake of completeness. The fact
that the prior contradictory statement of the witness was made
in a judicial proceeding renders it neither more nor less admis-
sible for impeachment purposes. The necessity for and method of
laying a foundation during the cross-examination are not af-
fected. No question of hearsay is involved. The method of
proving the former testimony does not differ from the method of
proof where it is admissible for any other purpose.2
'The use by a witness of prior testimony for purposes of refreshing recol-
lection will be dealt with in a later article.
'This last generalization is probably subject to one exception, vsz., that
R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 5401, which permits the use of a bill of exceptions to
prove prior testimony, does not in terms apply where the testimony is for
the purpose of impeachment. No cases have been found dealing with the
question. The following cases approve the use of prior testimony for im-
peachment purposes: Hays v. Waller (1830), 2 Mo. 222; Garret v. State
(1839), 6 Mo. 1, prior statement before committing magistrate; State v.
Phillips and Ross (1857), 24 Mo. 475, prior statement contained in deposition
before magistrate and coroner; State v. Cooper (1884), 83 Mo. 698; State v.
Matthews (1885), 88 Mo. 121, prior testimony before grand jury; Taussig
v. Shields (1887), 26 Mo. A. 318, "It is utterly immaterial on what previ-
ous occasion, whether on oath or not"; State v. Parker (1888), 96 Mo.
382, 9 S. W. 728; Kreibohm v. Yancey (1899), 154 Mo. 67, 55 S. W. 260;
State v. Gatlin (1902), 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. W. 885, former testimony before
coroner; State v. Ripey (1910), 229 Mo. 657, 129 S. W. 646, testimony taken
at preliminary hearing; State v. Eastham (1912), 240 Mo. 241, 144 S. W.
492; Farrar v. Met. St. Ry. (1913), 249 Mo.- 210, 155 S. W. 439; Peppers v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1927), 316 Mo. 1104, 295 S. W. 757, deal-
ing with special procedure in examination where former testimony contained
in deposition; Shull v. Kallauner (1927), 300 S. W. 554; Showen v. Met. St.
Ry. Co. (1915), 191 Mo. A. 292, 177 S. W. 791; Burgess v. Garvin & Price
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II. ADMISSIONS
The application of the law of admissions to the use against a
party of statements made by him in a prior trial presents no
novel problems. In State v. Glahn,3 wherein the defendant was
tried for murder, the court presents the issue and its decision, as
follows: "A witness was allowed to give evidence as to what
defendant testified to on the first trial. We can see no valid ob-
jection to such evidence. Had the defendant made the state-
ments out of court, evidence of them would be admissible. They
are none the less admissible because made by defendant under
oath." And in Schlicker v. Gordon,4 in which the plaintiff was
interrogated with a view to bringing out the fact that he had
given testimony at a former trial in conflict with his present
statements, it is said: "Being a party to the record, and the
party in interest, the admissions and statements of the plaintiff
against his interests, and in conflict with his present claim or
attitude, are admissible in evidence against him whenever and
wherever made.' ' s
Merc. Co. (1925), 219 Mo. A. 162, 272 S. W. 108; State v. Hutchens (1925),
271 S. W. 525; Troxell v. De Shon (1926), 279 S. W. 438, as to method of
examination when former testimony contained in deposition; Whitlow v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1926), 282 S. W. 525; Vanausdol v. Bank of
Odessa (1928), 5 S. W. (2nd) 109; Williamson v. Frank (1928), 5 S. W.
(2nd) 462.
(1888), 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. W. 266.
'(1885), 19 Mo. A. 479.
'See, accord, Charleson v. Hunt (1858), 27 Mo. 34, but compare, Mulli-
ken v. Greer (1838), 5 Mo. 489; Glenn v. Lehnen (1873), 54 Mo. 45; Prewitt
v. Martin, Adm. (1875), 59 Mo. 325; Pomeroy v. Benton (1882), 77 Mo. 64,
82; State v. Jefferson (1882), 77 Mo. 136; State v. Eddings (1880), 71 Mo.
545; State ex rel. v. Chatham Nat'l Bank (1883), 80 Mo. 626, "A party's
deposition, as a written statement of facts, is admissible, although he may
be present to testify or has testified."--defendant having offered the depo-
sition of plaintiff; Bogie v. Nolan (1888), 96 Mo. 85, 9 S. W. 14, overruling
Priest v. Way (1885), 87 Mo. 16, which had held that a deposition of a party
to a cause may be read in evidence against him in another cause as an ad-
mission, but not in the same cause in which it is taken; State v. Young
(1889), 99 Mo. 666, 12 S. W. 879, a dissenting opinion contending that a
foundation should be laid as in case of impeachment of ordinary witness,
thereby failing to recognize the fundamental difference between admissions
of a party to the action and the impeachment of a witness by proof of con-
tradictory statements; Branahl v. Watson, 13 Mo. A. 596; Wiseman v. St.
L., Ark. & Tex. Ry. Co. (1888), 30 Mo. A. 516; Padley v. Catterlin (1896),
64 Mo. A. 629, 640; Cramer v. Harmon (1907), 126 Mo. A. 54, 103 S. W.
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III. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR TESTIMONY OF A NON-AVAILABLE
WITNESS
The basic and likewise the simplest situation in which this
question arises is as follows: Action by A against B, A being a
private person or the State. W testifies on behalf of A. There
is an appeal and a reversal and a retrial. W, in the meantime
has died. Through X, A offers W's former testimony. A num-
ber of variants of these facts which involve the same principle
will appear in the discussion.
The problem here presented lies definitely in the field of hear-
say, since the evidence "does not derive its value solely from the
credit to be given to the witness who is before" the present tri-
bunal.6 The admissibility of such evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule is everywhere conceded, subject, however, to
certain limitations. If any exception to hearsay is to be justi-
fied, this one is clearly unassailable, for it dispenses with only
one of the safeguards set up for the testing of the credibility of
1086; Chalmers v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1910), 153 Mo. A. 55, 131
S. W. 903.
Dempsey v. Lawson (1898), 76 Mo. A. 522, 527, sustains the trial court
in its refusal to let defendant read a copy of the stenographer's report of
plaintiff's testimony at a former trial, the decision is based upon three points
- (1) that plaintiff was in court, (2) that a proper foundation was not laid,
and (3) that defendant was using a copy and not the original report-points
1 and 2 are wholly without merit since they apply to prior testimony of a
mere witness and not to admissions of a party, and are not supported by
any other Missouri authority with the exception of Byrd v. Hartman (1897),
70 Mo. A. 57, which is cited and relied upon. The third point is probably
well taken for it does not appear that the rules relative to refreshing recol-
lection were complied with.
In Roberts v. Weber Motor Car Co. (1921), 232 S. W. 224, the holding is
that the testimony of the defendant as given at a former trial was properly
excluded because "competent only for the purpose of impeachment" is diffi-
cult to understand. The point is not developed and the decision is not
officially reported. It is not to be supported.
State v. Miller (1915), 264 Mo. 441, 175 S. W. 191, holds testimony of de-
fendant as given at coroner's inquest admissible. The court says: "the
test as to the admissibility of this character of testimony is no longer
whether it was made in a judicial proceeding under oath, but, was it volun-
tary? If so, then it is admissible, otherwise not. This rule is clearly an-
nounced in State v. Wisdom, 119 Mo. I. c. 551, in which earlier cases de-
claratory of the same doctrine are cited and discussed."
' State v. McO'Blenis (1857), 24 Mo. 402, 414; Leeser v. Boekhoff (1889),
38 Mo. A. 445, 454.
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the percipient witness, viz., the chance to observe his demeanor.
And the free use of depositions today reveals the relatively slight
importance attached to this procedural element. In other words
it is testimony given under oath and subject to cross-ex-
amination.
Before taking up in detail the general conditions of admissi-
bility such as the nonavailability of the witness and the same-
ness of the issues and of the parties, a special objection which
has been lodged against its use in criminal cases will be disposed
of, viz., that it violates the constitutional right of confrontation.
The courts have declined to sustain this objection and have as-
signed two grounds. The first is that the constitution is to be
construed in the light of the common law which existed at the
time of its adoption. At that time hearsay evidence, such as dy-
ing declarations and testimony of the type here under considera-
tion, was freely admitted in criminal cases. The right invoked
has not been assumed to control the kind of evidence that the
witness on the stand can give. This argument seems unanswer-
able. No one thinks of the hearsay exceptions as constituting a
violation of the right of confrontation. 7 The second ground as-
signed is that the defendant was confronted at the former trial
by the witness whose statements are now offered. This point
seems less conclusive but has been stressed in addition to the
other one by a number of courts.8
A. Non-Availability
In most of the exceptions to the hearsay rule the percipient
'State v. McO'Blenis (1857), 24 Mo. 402. At page 416 the court says:
"It may as well be the boast of an Englishman living under the common
law, as of a citizen of this state living under our constitution, that in a
criminal prosecution he has a right to meet the witnesses against him face
to face; and yet it was never supposed in England, at any time, that this
privilege was violated by the admission of a dying declaration, or of the
deposition of a deceased witness, under proper circumstances; nor, indeed, by
the reception of any other hearsay evidence established and recognized by law
as an exception to the general rule." There is a vigorous dissenting opinion
in the case by Judge Ryland. The two sides of this question are nowhere
better presented. In State v. Houser (1858), 26 Mo. 431, the question was
reexamined and the McO'Blenis case approved. However for a more
modern decision see State v. Heffernan (1909), 24 S. D. 1, 123 N. W. 87.
'U. S. v. Macomb (1851), 5 McLean 286; State v. Hefferman (1909), 24
S. D. 1, 123 N. W. 87.
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witness must be non-available, but the decisions are far from
uniform in their determination of what will constitute legal non-
availability. The factual test has not been the exclusive one. In
Missouri it is necessary to place criminal cases, at least where
the State is offering the evidence, and civil cases in separate
categories.
The first criminal case to consider evidence of a witness given
at a prior trial (in the particular cases at a preliminary hear-
ing) was State v. McO'Blenis.9 In that case the witness had
thereafter died. His testimony was held admissible. In State
v. Houser a witness who had testified against the defendant be-
fore the examining magistrate could not be found. The admis-
sion of her testimony was held reversible error both on the
basis of authority, English and American, and on principle.
"Upon principles of public policy the admission of such depo-
sitions, testimony in the mere absence of the witness, is ex-
tremely questionable, so that both principle and precedent con-
cur in excluding them."'1  The question is examined again in
State v. Nicholas" and the court concludes: "The question in
this State was settled in the affirmative that such evidence is
competent only when the witness is dead, and in the negative
that the evidence is incompetent when the witness is living al-
though beyond the jurisdiction of the State."
It will be observed that these are all cases in which the evi-
dence was sought to be introduced by the State. State v. Rose, 2
however, carries the inference that if the evidence is offered by
the defendant, absence from the jurisdiction may be put in the
same legal category as death. This distinction is recognized as
sound in State v. Nicholas," wherein in reference to State v.
Rose, supra, it is said: "It will be seen, however, that the ques-
tion presented in that case was where the defendant offered the
evidence, and not the State, and hence the question of constitu-
tional right did not arise.' '14
1 (1857), 24 Mo. 402.
" State v. Houser (1858), 26 Mo. 431, 440. The court adds however that
"If the absence of the witness was procured by the prisoner the rule would
be different."
(1910), 149 Mo. A. 121, 125-127, 130 S. W. 96.
(1887), 92 Mo. 201, 206, 4 S. W. 733.
(1910), 149 Mo. A. 121, 126, 130 S. W. 96.
"See, also, State v. Coleman (1906), 199 Mo. 112, 119, 97 S. W. 574, and
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The rules evolved in criminal cases may then be summarized
as follows:
1. If the evidence is offered by the State, it may be received,
if the witness is dead. It will not be received if he is absent
from the jurisdiction unless by procurement of the defendant.
A fortiori it will not be received if he is in hiding or otherwise
undiscoverable within the states, unless at the instance of the
defendant. The question of insanity or other permanent dis-
ability has not been raised. 'The reasons assigned for restricting
the rule are not subject to complete approval. Sound principle
does not support the limitations. This is admitted in State v.
Houser.15 If the person is for any reason beyond the reach of
the court he might just as well be dead. The only reason in
policy that can be assigned is that the state might prefer the
record to the use of a witness of unlikely mien and for that rea-
son spirit the witness away. But this is too unlikely to warrant
a general rule of exclusion. One cannot avoid the feeling that
the Missouri court is after all placing an arbitrary restriction
because of lingering feelings that there is considerable force in
the point which divided the court in the McO'Blenis case, that at
least the spirit of the constitutional right of confrontation is
being violated. This is definitely conveyed in the reference made
in State v. Nicholas 6 to State v. Rose.17 There is abundant au-
thority in other states for a liberal acceptance of excuses other
than death in criminal as well as in civil cases.
2. If the evidence is offered by the defendant it may be re-
ceived whether the witness be dead or absent from the State,
and, a fortiori, when he is for any other reason definitely un-
available.
In civil cases, nonavailability because of death was first offered
as an excuse and accepted. 18 Thereafter the rule was broadened
as follows: ". . . where there is a proper showing of diligence,
State v. Riddle (1904), 179 Mo. 287, 78 S. W. 606. State v. Butler (1913),
247 Mo. 685, 153 S. W. 1042, has put the matter fully at rest by reversing
the trial court for excluding evidence offered by defendant, it appearing
that the witness was out of the state.
(1858), 26 Mo. 431, 439.1 Supra, note 13.
TSupra, note 12.
Breeden's Adm. v. Feurt (1879), 70 Mo. 624.
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and it is impossible to have the living witness, and without any
fault, his deposition has not been taken, the rule as to admitting
the testimony of a witness given at a former trial applies. We
do not think it is to be confined exclusively to the case of the
death of the witness. Where he might have been had, however,
or his testimony should, with proper diligence, have been taken
by deposition, the other side may well object to the replacing
testimony in the ordinary form by the record of statements of
the witness at a former trial.' 1 And two years later the St.
Louis Court of Appeals said: "Where a witness is beyond the
jurisdiction, and after every effort has been exhausted, it is
found impossible to take his deposition, it is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge to admit testimony as to his evi-
dence at a future trial of the same case.
' 20
Breadth of doctrine was again set up in Scoville v. The Hanni-
bal & St. Joseph R. R. Co.21 as follows: "It is laid down by Mr.
Greenleaf, that, on the trial of the same cause of action between
the same parties, the testimony of a witness given on a former
trial may be received, if the witness is dead, or out of the juris-
diction of the court, or cannot be found after diligent search, or
is insane, or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned,
but appears to have been kept away by the adverse party."22
This marks the development under the common law. The
only limitation to be noted is that set up in the two appellate
court cases, viz., that absence from the jurisdiction must be sup-
plemented by proof of inability to secure the witness' disposition.
This qualification of the rule of absence has little, if anything,
to justify it, since the prior testimony and a deposition are es-
sentially on a par. The gain in any event by securing a deposi-
tion hardly justifies the multiplication of the administrative ma-
chinery involved. Moreover the limitation does not obtain under
the statutory procedure set up in 1899 to which attention is not
directed.
Today, two statutes control most of the situations which arise.
" Franklin v. Gumersell (1881), 11 Mo. A. 306, 314.
" Augusta Wine Co. v. Weippert (1883), 14 Mo. A. 483.
1 (1887), 94 Mo. 84, 86, 6 S. W. 654, loss of speech through stroke of
paralysis.
'See, also, Showen, Adm. v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (1912), 164 Mo. A. 41,
51, 148 S. W. 135.
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The first provides that it is proper to read evidence as preserved
in a bill of exceptions "in the same manner and with like effect
as if such testimony had been preserved in a deposition in said
cause." 2  The second provides that a deposition may be read
under the following conditions :24 "First, if the witness resides
or is gone out of the state; second, if he be dead; third, if by rea-
son of age, sickness or bodily infirmity he be unable to or can-
not safely attend court; fourth, if he reside in a county other
than that in which the trial is held, or if he be gone to a greater
distance than forty miles from the place of trial without the con-
sent, connivance or collusion of the party requiring his testi-
mony; fifth, if he be a judge of a court of record, a practicing
attorney or physician, and engaged in the discharge of his offi-
cial or professional duty at the time of the trial."
The cases reveal no problems of serious import arising under
the various subdivisions of this section of the statute. A few
points, however, have been made a matter of decision. The first
provision is not to be qualified by requiring proof of diligence
to secure the return of a witness who is out of the state.2 1 Where
it is sought to introduce the former testimony on the ground
that the witness resides in another county, no presumption of
such residence will be indulged based upon the fact that the
former trial was held in such other county, but proof thereof
must be presented.1
6
One question suggests itself which the statute and the cases
do not answer. Suppose the testimony given at the former trial
is not preserved in a bill of exceptions and the witness is a physi-
cian, let us say, engaged in his professional duty. The point of
difficulty obviously is that on one hand the case does not fall
specifically within the statute because the statute refers only to
proof by means of the bill of exceptions, and that, on the other
hand, the common law, which would have no difficulty in allow-
ing a different method of proof, has not determined whether such
R. S. Mo. 1899, sec. 3149, now R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 5401.
R. S. Mo. 1899, sec. 2904, now R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 5467.
Ratliff Bros. v. Quincy, Omaha & K. C. R. R. Co. (1908), 131 Mo. A.
118, 110 S. W. 606; Fowler v. Cavitt (1927), 294 S. W. 731. See, also,
Bender v. Bender (1917), 193 S. W. 294; Scott v. Am. Ins. Co. (1920), 222
S. W. 1047.
" O'Brien v. St. Louis Transit Co. (19081, 212 Mo. 59, 110 S. W. 705,
15 Ann. Cas. 86.
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a witness should be considered nonavailable. A decision in
favor of admissibility in such cases can be reached therefore
only by expanding the common law definition of non-availability
to include the categories enumerated in the statute. In reaching
such a result there is nothing of course to prevent the court from
considering the statutory provision as determining the scope of
wise policy. The prior testimony is the same no matter whether
proved by a bill of exceptions or by any other acceptable means,
and it is the practical non-availability of the witness, within the
limits of sound policy, that constitutes the necessity for resort-
ing to it.
B. Sameness of Issues
The courts agree that testimony given at the former trial is
not admissible unless the issues are essentially the same. Per-
haps it would be more accurate to say, unless the issue or issues
as to which the testimony in question is offered entered in sub-
stantially the same way in the two proceedings. The following
test is given in Jaccard v. Anderson:27 "The principle upon
which the distinction turns is the right of cross-examination,
and where the issues are so nearly the same that it is apparent
that there was an opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to
the same natter in both cases, the issues will be considered as
sufficiently identical."
A more recent case accepts this test, but seems open to serious
queation in its application thereof. In Haglage v. Monark Gaso-
line & Oil Co. 2 9 the action was by the husband for loss of services
due to personal injuries to his wife. She had previously sued
defendant in her own right for her injuries. Plaintiff offered a
deposition taken in the action by his wife against defendant.
The trial court admitted the deposition. The decision was re-
versed by the appellate court on the ground that the issues were
not the same.2 9 The result was reached by the following chain
of reasoning:
"The issues to be determined in the case brought by re-
spondent's wife against appellant were whether or not she
' (1865), 37 Mo. 91.
(App., 1927), 298 S. W. 117.
Reference is also made to the fact that the parties were not the same but
this point is not stressed.
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had been injured as a result of defendant's negligence and
the character, extent and result of such injuries. The is-
sues to be determined in the case at bar are: (1) The same
issues as were involved in the wife's case; (2) loss to re-
spondent of services of his wife resulting from said injuries;
(3) the amount expended by respondent in an attempt to
cure his wife of said injury; (4) the injury to respondent's
automobile. It is true that the issues involved in the wife's
case are also involved in appellant's case. It is also true
that the deposition here in question bore upon an issue in-
volved in both cases, to-wit, the cause of the collision and
plaintiff's injury, but there are other issues involved in
appellant's suit, and we can readily see that, if the depo-
sition taken in the wife's case may be used in appellant's
case, appellant was deprived of the right to cross-examine
the witness as to his knowledge, if any, relative to the
damage to respondent's car, the amount paid out by respond-
ent in an attempt to cure his wife of the injuries she re-
ceived, her condition since said injury, her ability to per-
form her household duties or any other fact he might know
relevant to such issues."
This reasoning will not hold. There was no lack of oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness as to the issues which were
the same in both cases and it was only upon these issues that the
deposition bore. In stressing the making it the basis of the
decision that the defendant lacked opportunity to cross-examine
as to the new and entirely distinct issues which were added in
the second case, the court missed the whole point of the test laid
down in Jacca rd v. Anderson,"0 and ignored the rationalization
underlying exceptions to the hearsay rule. Subjecting the wit-
ness to cross-examination on the issue to which his examination
in chief is directed tests the worth of the evidence which he has
assumed to give and it is the worth of that evidence that is in
question, not the further uses to which such witness might be
put in the case. It is an exception to the hearsay rule that we
are dealing with. The witness is not available. His statement
made upon another occasion is offered in his stead. The whole
course of the development of the hearsay rule favors its accept-
ance if made under circumstances which reasonably guarantee
its trustworthiness and assure us that it will shed a reasonably
true light on the phase of the pending case to which it relates.
" Supra, note 27.
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In all other exceptions to the hearsay rule the party against.
whom it is offered is without any opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant even on the matter covered directly by his state-
ment.
C. Identity of Parties
The usual statement is that evidence given at the prior trial
is not admissible in the later trial unless the parties in the two
actions are identical or in privity.31 The fundamental purpose
of this requirement is essentially the same as that which under-
lies the rule as to identity of issues, viz., that the testimony shall
have passed the scrutiny of one who had "the same interest and
motive in his cross-examination" that the present opponent
would have. It is this factor that establishes its present worth.
Too often this purpose or objective has been overlooked by the
courts. The well-known English case of Morgan v. Nichol132
is in point. A previous action had been brought by the plain-
tiff's son against the defendant's father, to recover certain
premises, it being supposed at the time that the plaintiff was
dead. In the former proceeding a witness had testified on be-
half of the claimant, but had since died. The admissibility of
this testimony on behalf of the plaintiff in the principal case was
denied. The reasoning was as follows: " . . . evidence cannot
be admissible against one party and not against the other; and it
is clear that, if this evidence had been tendered by the defendant,
the plaintiff would have said that he was not present at the
former trial, and did not claim under the former plaintiff." This
line of reasoning is utterly unsound, and has twice been re-
pudiated in Missouri.3 3 If the issue of fact to which the evi-
dence is addressed is the same in both cases and the party
31 Leslie v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co. (1892), 110 Mo. 31, 19 S. W. 308.
First action by A against B, second action by A against B and C; Hey-
worth v. Miller Grain & Elevator Co. (1903), 174 Mo. 171, 73 S. W. 498;
Central Bank of K. C. v. Thayer (1904), 184 Mo. 61, 99, 82 S. W. 142;
Queatham v. Modern Woodmen of America (1910), 148 Mo. A. 33, 127
S. W. 651.
'L. R. 2 Com. P1. 117, (1866).
Harrell v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R. Co. (1916), 186 S. W. 677 (not
officially reported); Lampe v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n (1920), 204 Mo.
A. 373, 380, 221 S. W. 447. In the latter case the effort to find privity
seems gratuitous. See to same effect Minea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co.
(1913), 179 Mo. A. 705, 162 S. W. 741.
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against whom the evidence is offered is the same, or is in privity
-with the party against whom it was offered in the previous case,
the full purpose of the rule is served. All argument as to re-
ciprocity is beside the point.3 4 A further complaint against
Morgan v. Nichol seems permissible. Is the assumption well
founded that evidence given by a deceased witness for the former
defendant would have been inadmissible if it had been offered
by the latter defendant? It is true that privity on the plaintiff's
side in the technical sense is lacking. But if substance rather
than form were to prevail, it would not seem unreasonable to
infer that the evidence would have been subjected to quite as
careful scrutiny as if actual privity of estate had existed.
Another Missouri case calls for critical discussion. In State
v. Eastham5 the defendant was being tried for the murder of
one Stacey. Prior to this trial defendant's brother had been
tried and acquitted of the same charge. Defendant offered to
prove the testimony of W, since deceased, given at the previous
trial. On the objection of the State the evidence was excluded.
In a decision of affirmance the Supreme Court said: "It is a
well-known fact that a great many witnesses in criminal cases
shade or color their evidence in proportion to the degree of their
sympathy for or hatred of the person on trial. For this reason
alone, the testimony given by the deceased witness in the trial of
George Eastham was properly excluded at the trial of defend-
ant. It is only when a witness has testified in a former trial of
the same criminal case that evidence of such witness, if dead,
becomes admissible."
It will be noted that there is complete identity on the plain-
tiff's side of the two cases and it is against the plaintiff that the
evidence is offered. So far as the mere question of identity of
parties is concerned therefore the reason for exclusion fails by
authority of Harrell v. R. R.3 6 and Lampe v. St. Louis Brewing
Ass'n.3 7 Lack of identity of issues, which would have offered a
much stronger ground on which to rest the decision, is not men-
tioned. However it is doubtful if that ground would suffice.
1 3 Wigmore, EVIDENCE (2d Ed.), sec. 1388; Ray v. Henderson (1914),
44 Ok. 174, 144 P. 175, (note thereon in 28 HARv. L. REv. 429).
- (1912), 240 Mo. 241, 144 S. W. 492.
'Supra, note 33.
"Ibid.
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There was much overlapping of the issues. One might say that
there was substantial identity, due to the fact that the prosecu-
tions both grew out of a general encounter between the deceased
on one side and the present defendant, the former defendant,
and a third brother on the other side. The line of reasoning
moreover, must utterly fail, else it will prove necessary to ex-
clude such evidence in all cases unless there is absolute identity
of parties in the two proceedings on both sides.
D. Proof of the Former Testimony
It is not necessary to prove the exact language of the witness
at the former proceeding. Proof of the "substance" of the testi-
mony will suffice.3 8 In upholding this practice, the Supreme
Court of the United States, with much point, says:
"Where a stenographer has not been employed, it can
rarely happen that anyone can testify to more than the
substance of what was testified by the deceased, . . . It has
been well said that if a witness in such case, from mere
memory, professes to be able to give the exact language, it
is reason for doubting his good faith and veracity."3 9
In State v. Able"0 the Missouri Court takes the wise precaution
to point out the necessity for distinguishing between the "sub-
stance" and the "effect" of the former testimony. The court
says:
"In applying the rule that the substance of what the de-
ceased witness testified to, may be given in evidence, the
distinction between narrating the statement made by the
witness and giving the effect of his testimony should be ob-
served. This distinction may be illustrated thus: If a wit-
ness state that A, as a witness on a former trial, proved the
execution of a written instrument by B, that would be giving
the effect of his testimony, which is nothing else than the
result or conclusion. But if the witness states that A testi-
fied that he had often seen B write, that he was acquainted
with his hand writing, and that the name subscribed to the
instrument of writing exhibited was B's signature, that
'State v. Able (1877), 65 Mo. 357, 367; State v. Hammond (1882), 77
Mo. 157; Davis v. Kline (1888), 96 Mo. 401, 9 S. W. 724; State v. Barnes
(1918), 274 Mo. 625, 631, 204 S. W. 267.
" Ruch v. Rock Island (1878), 97 U. S. 693.
0 (1877), 65 Mo. 357, 372.
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would be giving the substance of A's testimony, though it
might not be in the exact words."
The courts have permitted proof of the prior testimony by a
variety of methods. It may be proved (1) by any person who
heard it and who can swear to it from memory ;41 (2) by notes
taken by anyone who will swear to their accuracy-this includes,
of course, the record of the official court reporter identified and
verified in court by himself; 42 or (3) by the bill of exceptions.
The rules with reference to proof by means of the bill of ex-
ceptions fall into periods-those prior to 1891 when a statute
was passed relative to the use of the bill of exceptions, and those
arising under the statute.
In 1867, in Morris v. Hammerle43 the plaintiff offered the testi-
mony of a deceased witness given upon a former trial as pre-
served in the bill of exceptions. The evidence was excluded on
the ground that a proper foundation had not been laid. The
court said: "If notes of the testimony of such deceased witness
are relied upon, then there must be a witness competent to testify
and able to swear to their accuracy." 44
The method of introducing former testimony by means of a
bill of exceptions was simplified by statute in 1891. The statute
provides: "Whenever any competent evidence shall have been
preserved in any bill of exceptions in a cause, the same may be
thereafter used in the same manner and with like effect as if
such testimony had been preserved in a deposition in said
'"Breeden's Adm. v. Feurt (1879), 70 Mo. 624; Davis v. Kline (1888), 96
Mo. 401, 407, 9 S. W. 724 (dictum).
2 Sevier v. Allen (1899), 80 Mo. A. 187; Miller v. Geeser (1915), 193
Mo. A. 1, 22, 180 S. W. 3; Vessels v. Kansas City Light & Power Co.
(1920), 219 S. W. 80; State v. Barnes (1918), 274 Mo. 625, 204 S. W. 267;
Welp v. Bogy (1925), 218 Mo. A. 414, 277 S. W. 600.
(1867), 40 Mo. 489.
'In State v. Able (1877), 65 Mo. 357, the accuracy of the bill of excep-
tions was established by the testimony of one of defendant's counsel, who
testified that he kept minutes of the testimony on the former trial and
prepared the bill of exceptions from the notes kept by himself and by one
of his associates, and that when the bill of exceptions was being settled
interlineations were made both on behalf of plaintiff and defendant, and
that the bill was agreed upon by counsel for plaintiff and defendant in the
presence of the judge. The judge who presided and signed the bill of ex-
ceptions also testified that it was correct and the bill was held admissible.
See, also, Davis v. Kline (1888), 96 Mo. 401, 9 S. W. 724.
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cause. .... ,,45 The procedural simplification introduced by the
statute arises from the fact that the official certification provides
sufficient authentication and proof of correctness of the prior
testimony.
However, by linking the record of testimony preserved in the
bill of exceptions to a deposition an incidental problem of some
difficulty is presented. The difficulty has its inception in the case
of Samuel v. Withers" in which it was held that where a deposi-
tion, taken in another suit, is to be used "notice of its intended
use should be given, or it should be filed anew in the suit, so that
the party against whom it was intended to be read may have
knowledge thereof." The question next arose in Cabanne v.
Walker-7 where the court in reversing the trial court which had
excluded a deposition taken at a prior trial said:
"It is obvious that the rule requiring depositions taken
in another cause to be filed before they are read, is not an
inflexible one, and may be dispensed with when the ends of
justice require it. When the evidence can be met and would
operate as a surprise on the opposite party, it would not be
proper to depart from the rule but on terms which would
effect justice between the parties, . .."
Thus the court recedes from its unequivocal requirement
of filing of notice as set out in Samuel v. Withers.48 Parsons v.
Parsons"' reverts to the language of Samuel v. Withers, citing
the latter case but adding, "see, however, Cabanne v. Walker."
In Adams v. Raigner#0 the court reaches its decision by the fol-
lowing route:
"It is true that in Samuel v. Withers, 16 Mo. 532, it was
said that the deposition should be filed in the case where it
was proposed to use it, or notice should be given of its in-
" Mo. Laws 1891, p. 138. The same provision will be found in R. S. Mo.
1919, sec. 5401. See Bruce Lumber Co. v. Hoos (1896), 67 Mo. A. 264;
Remick, Adm. v. Am. Ins. Co. (1917), 195 S. W. 1049. It is important to
observe that the statute is not assuming to provide an exclusive method of
proving former testimony. Welp v. Bogy (1925), 218 Mo. A. 414, 277
S. W. 600.
"(1852), 16 Mo. 532, 541.
" (1860), 31 Mo. 274.
Supra, note 46.
"(1870), 45 Mo. 265.
M(1879), 69 Mo. 363.
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tended use, but in Cabanne v. Walker, 31 Mo. 285, this rule
was not considered indispensable, and was thought to be
merely intended to guard against surprise. That there was
no surprise in the present case is obvious. . . .The case
of Parsons v. Parsons, 45 Mo. 265, seems to be conclusive
on the point in this case . .."
More recently the question has had an inning in the Supreme
Court of Missouri in the case of Gaty v. United Railways Co."
in which the evidence at the prior trial was offered as preserved
in a bill of exceptions under section 5401 of the Revised Statutes.
In upholding the admission of the evidence the court said:
"It is further contended that Dr. Turley's testimony, as
preserved, could only be read after notice of intention to
use the same. It was so held in the early case of Samuel v.
Withers, 16 Mo. 632; but in Cabanne v. Walker, 31 Mo. 285,
the rule was held not to be indispensable, its purpose being
merely to guard against surprise. Dr. Turley's depo-
sition2 was taken by the defendant, his direct examination
having been conducted by the same counsel who represented
the defendant in the trial of the instant case. While de-
fendant's counsel may have been disappointed at the result
of the examination, it cannot be said that he was unfamiliar
with the testimony, and hence there is no ground for
surprise."'5 3
And thus the court still pays homage to the doctrine of Samuel
v. Withers, in the modified form given to it by Cabanne v.
Walker. In Cabanne v. Walker counsel in his brief' 4 indicated
that the trial court had based its exclusion of the prior deposition
on the ground that it had not been filed in the pending case "ac-
cording to the requirements of the thirteenth section of the
seventh article of the practice act of 1849." The act provided
that "If either party shall reply upon any record, deed, or other
writing, he shall file with his pleading an authenticated copy of
such record, and the original deed or writing if within his
power."
(1923), 251 S. W. 61.
"Another statement in the case is to the effect that Dr. Turley "had testi-
fied at a former trial of this case, and his testimony was preserved in a bill
of exceptions," so the word "deposition" is used inadvisedly.
See, also, Harris v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. Ry. Co. (1907), 124 Mo. A. 45,
49, 101 S. W. 601.
"See Cabanne v. Walker (1860), 31 Mo. 274, 279.
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This rule both in its original and in its altered form is in its
origin without foundation and on evidential analogies is wholly
illogical. It is doubtful if the statute of 1849 had reference to
all mere documentary methods of proof, and, if applicable to the
present problem, under no circumstances could it be satisfied by
anything other than filing as prescribed therein. The alternative
of notice, which in turn might be dispensed with, finds no sup-
port in it but is rather precluded by it. Later this statute was
so altered as by its terms to apply only to cases where the action
is based upon the document.55
The rule cannot be supported by analogies. In the use of
evidence given at a prior trial, as previously stated, we are deal-
ing merely with an exception to the hearsay rule. Common law
decisions have rendered it admissible, within limits. In the
present connection we are dealing with a method of proof
merely. It is not even an exclusive method. One is not con-
fined to the bill of exceptions as a method of proof. One may
call the reporter, for example, and prove the prior testimony
through him, by his notes. No one has ever thought of requir-
ing notice of such intention. In no other exception to the hear-
say rule has there been any requirement of notice of intent to
use it or of the particular method of proving it, even though it
be a documentary method. Surprise may be quite as common in
all these other situations as in the present set up. Nor should
anything turn upon the fact that the testimony introduced in
the former trial was in the form of a deposition, if that hap-
pens to be the case. After a deposition has been read into the
record, it is, per se, functus officio. It is the record of the
testimony from that point forward that counts in quite the same
way that it does as to the testimony of a witness who has testi-
fied in person.
This rule as to filing and notice is an encumbering excresence.
The statute does not require it. It has no support in principle.
It complicates procedure. It should be discarded at the first
opportunity.
The reference in section 5401 of the Revised Statutes to a
deposition has involved the court in one further difficulty. In
State v. Speyer" it is said that the statute "has no application
"R. S. Mo. 1855, Chap. 128, sec. 60.
(1907), 207 Mo. 540, 548, 106 S. W. 505.
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to a defendant in any case, criminal or civil." The reasoning
in support of this statement, which incidentally is dictum, is in
part as follows: "The deposition of a defendant in a felony case
is never taken, because the law requires his presence during the
entire trial." As a method of construction this is open to serious
question. Is not the real aim of the statute to make the bill
of exceptions authentic evidence of testimony given at a prior
trial? If this is true, it will be quite as authentic in proving
what the defendant said, where that is admissible, as it will in
proving what any witness said. The statute is not dealing
primarily with admissibility but rather with method of proof.
It has given the bill of exceptions the evidentiary force of a
public record. The reference in this connection to a deposition
is incidental, rather than vital.
A further collateral question of procedure in proving prior
testimony arises in connection with the best evidence rule, in the
handling of which, it is believed, the court has gone somewhat
astray. The question was presented in a typical manner in
Turner v. Railroad :57 Defendant offered to prove by a witness
the evidence of plaintiff on a former trial. Plaintiff's testi-
mony had been taken by the reporter and the notes were still in
existence. The court excluded the testimony on the ground that
the notes were the best evidence and that the defendant had not
shown diligent effort to obtain them. In affirming the trial
court, the appellate court cited with approval an earlier appel-
late court decision 8 and reasoned as follows:
"It requires no argument to support the view, that the
statements of a witness taken down in writing at the time
by a skilful official under oath are more reliable for ac-
curacy than the recollection of a witness and especially so
after a long lapse of time. It is true, as contended by de-
fendant, that the notes of an official stenographer are not
infallible, but that is no reason why they should be accepted
in preference to that which in all instances is much more
fallible."
The reasoning is in itself plausible and not without force but
it is based upon a misconception of the best-evidence rule. That
rule provides only that a writing is the best evidence of what it
(1909), 138 Mo. A. 143, 120 S. W. 128.
Estes v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1905), 111 Mo. A. 1, 85 S. W. 909.
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contains. It is better evidence in the same chain, not better
evidence generally, that makes certain evidence secondary.
There is no general rule or principle of evidence that requires
one to resort to the best evidence in his power in preference to
evidence that may be relatively weaker or less satisfactory. In
such cases the law has gone no further than to say that if one
uses poorer evidence when better evidence is available he may
be subject to the imputation that the facts as revealed by the
better evidence would not be so favorable to him or might even
be against him. Suppose one wishes to prove what A said on a
certain occasion. X and Y were present on the occasion. X
made a memorandum then and there as to what A said. Y did
not. The best evidence rule has no application to Y's testimony.
His testimony is not secondary but direct as to what A said.
Indeed the rule would not require X to use or introduce his
memorandum, if he could recall without it what A said. Only
in case of past recollection recorded would the best evidence rule
come into operation. This illustration does not differ, of course,
from the set up where the point in issue is the proof of what a
witness testified to at a former trial.50
m Some support for the Missouri doctrine is to be found in Jones, EVI-
DENCE (3d ed.), sec. 335, where in discussing proof of a dying declaration
the writer declares the following rule: "When the declarations are reduced
to writing and signed by the declarant, it is generally held that the writing
is the best evidence and must be produced." The cases cited, however, con-
tain support only in dicta, and People v. Vernon (1868), 35 Cal. 49 is
squarely contra. Moreover the cases cited by Jones make it clear that the
best evidence rule has no application unless the written memorandum of
the dying declaration was signed by the declarant. See Dunn v. People
(1898), 172 Ill. 582. Even with this limitation we take issue with the
soundness of the rule.
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